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Abstract What effects do International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans have on borrow-
ing countries? Even after decades of research, no consensus exists. We offer a straight-
forward explanation for the seemingly mixed effects of IMF loans. We argue that
different loans have different effects because of the varied conditions attached to IMF
financing. To demonstrate this point, we investigate IMF loans with and without
conditions that require public sector reforms in exchange for financing. We find that
the addition of a public sector reform condition to a country’s IMF program signifi-
cantly reduces government spending on the public sector wage bill. This evidence
suggest that conditions are a key mechanism linking IMF lending to policy outcomes.
Although IMF loans with public sector conditions prompt cuts to the wage bill in the
short-term, these cuts do not persist in the longer-term. Borrowers backslide on
internationally mandated spending cuts in response to domestic political pressures.
Keywords IMF. Public sector . Conditionality . Government spending . Reform .
Austerity .Wage bill . Loan conditions . Public sector employment . Backsliding
What effects do International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans have on borrowing coun-
tries? Even after decades of research, no consensus exists on this topic. Scholars
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disagree about how IMF loans affect countries’ economic growth, public expenditures,
poverty, and income distributions (Oberdabernig 2013; Nooruddin and Vreeland 2010;
Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Nsouli et al. 2004; Dreher 2006; Bulíř and Moon 2004;
Clements et al. 2013; Garuda 2000; Hajro and Joyce 2009; Kentikelenis et al. 2015;
Vreeland 2002; Bas and Stone 2014). Scholars also disagree about the mechanisms
through which IMF loans work (Dreher 2009; Vreeland 2006). Do IMF loans exert
their influence indirectly through signaling to market actors, for example, or directly via
the conditions attached to countries’ loan programs?
Conditions are one of the most contentious features of IMF lending. The
Bconditions^ attached to countries’ loan programs stipulate policy reforms required in
exchange for IMF financing. Since the 1970s, the IMF has provided countries with
financial assistance contingent on the implementation of specific policies (Dreher 2009,
233). The policy reforms required in exchange for IMF financing are stipulated in the
loan’s conditions, which often require changes with major distributive consequences.
Because the reforms often entail substantial political costs, borrowers sometimes fail to
comply with their loan conditions (Easterly 2001; Bird and Willett 2004; Ivanova et al.
2003; Dreher 2003; Steinwand and Stone 2008; Vreeland 2006; Joyce 2004). If
countries do not comply with their loan conditions, then the observed effects of IMF
lending must occur through other mechanisms.
Questions about whether IMF loan conditions Bmatter^ are therefore deeply con-
nected to compliance (Vreeland 2006). But grappling with the conditionality-
compliance link is complicated because IMF loans often contain many different
conditions, and these conditions vary between programs (Gould 2006; Stone 2008;
Caraway et al. 2012; Copelovitch 2010; Vreeland 2006). If conditions differ between
loans, and conditionality is a key mechanism through which IMF lending works, then
IMF programs should have varying effects. Yet most investigations of IMF lending fail
to account for the variation in loan conditions. Instead, they treat all IMF programs as
being identical and expect them to have a single, invariant effect on borrowers. 1
Similarly, scholars typically assess compliance through measures that pertain to whole
IMF programs (e.g., program suspension) (Steinwand and Stone 2008). But most
countries’ loan programs include multiple conditions, and if some conditions are more
difficult to implement than others, borrowers may comply with only a fraction of their
total conditions. Compliance, in other words, is not an all or nothing proposition.
Large-N quantitative studies have yet to provide a convincing test of whether loan
conditions are a central mechanism through which IMF lending impacts borrowing
countries. We aim to provide such a test. We argue that IMF loans with different
conditions should have different effects if conditionality is one of the mechanisms
linking IMF loans to policy outcomes. To this end, we take up Vreeland's (2006)
proposal that scholars adopt a disaggregated approach to studying the effects of IMF
lending by connecting specific conditions to specific outcomes. We examine whether
specific loan conditions have measurable effects on borrowing countries’ spending
decisions. We do so through an analysis of a substantively important and politically
sensitive topic: loan conditions that require cuts to the public sector wage bill.
1 Scholars often use a simple dichotomous variable to indicate whether a country is participating in an IMF
program or not.
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The public sector wage bill is often the single largest expenditure in governments’
budgets. It comprises almost 30% of total government expenditure in lower income
countries on average (Das 1998, 16; Forni and Novta 2014, 5). Given this, the public
sector wage bill presents an inviting target for cuts. But slashing the wage bill risks
compromising essential functions and can provoke protests from powerful constituen-
cies. Governments therefore tend to be averse to cutting the public sector wage bill
(Bienen and Gersovitz 1985; Shepherd 2003; Nooruddin and Vreeland 2010).
While virtually all IMF loans contain general fiscal conditions that require govern-
ments meet an aggregate spending limit, most loans do not specify cuts to the public
sector wage bill. In fact, only 25 % of IMF programs include conditions that explicitly
require cuts to the public sector. If conditionality is one of the mechanisms through
which IMF lending affects outcomes, then countries that receive public sector condi-
tions should respond differently than countries that do not. We hypothesize that
borrowers who receive a condition that targets the public sector will make deeper cuts
to the public sector wage bill than those who do not. Borrowers who receive targeted
public sector conditions must cut the wage bill or risk losing access to IMF funding. In
contrast, governments facing only general fiscal targets will make cuts to less politically
sensitive budget items.
Using novel data on IMF loan conditions, we find that seemingly small differences
in the content of conditions has measureable effects on borrowers’ behavior. Countries
that receive conditions specifically targeting the public sector make deeper cuts to the
public sector wage bill than countries that do not receive such conditions in their IMF
program. This finding demonstrates both the utility and importance of disaggregating
IMF loan conditions. Because most IMF loans do not mandate cuts to the public sector,
any study that did not account for this fact would likely reach erroneous conclusions
about the effects of IMF lending on public sector reform. As we show, IMF loans with
public sector conditions reduce government spending on the public sector wage bill by
more than IMF loans without public sector conditions.2
Although IMF loans with public sector conditions prompt cuts to the wage bill in the
short-term, our results suggest that such cuts may be temporary. Using an error
correction model, we estimate the short- and long-term effects of adding a public sector
condition to a country’s IMF program. While public sector conditions engender
significant short-term cuts to the wage bill, these cuts do not persist in the longer-term.
The selection of a politically sensitive and contentious issue, public sector reform,
sets up a hard test for assessing whether IMF conditions matter. If conditionality can
exert an effect on the public sector, then IMF loan conditions should also be able
to affect other less politically volatile policy areas. We speculate about, but leave for
future research, the possibility that IMF conditions in other areas may be more
successful in stimulating long-term change.
The rest of our paper develops as follows. First, we discuss the emergence of the size
of the public sector as a policy problem and describe the prevalence of targeted loan
conditions. We then present our theoretical argument and conduct several empirical
tests that assess whether borrowing countries that receive targeted conditions prune
2 It is important to note that our results pertain only to the subset of countries that borrow from the IMF
because we examine only countries with IMF programs. However, governments may cut the public sector in
the absence of an IMF program.
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spending on public sector wages more deeply than those that do not receive these
conditions. We conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of our findings.
1 The size of the public sector as a policy problem
The size of the public sector became a focus of international attention in the 1980s as
ideas about the reduced role of the state in the economy gained traction (Rapley 2002).
The election of Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the
United Kingdom, and the emergence of the BWashington Consensus^ in international
financial institutions, provided the political and institutional muscle for ideas about the
optimal size of the public sector to influence policy design. Policymakers soon began to
identify the size of the public sector as a problem that needed to be addressed
(Biersteker 1990; Nunberg and Nellis 1992; Stevenson 1992; Goldsmith 1999; Lee
and Strang 2006).3 The fiscal crises that beset many developing countries in the 1980s
gave advocates of public sector downsizing increased leverage to advocate for these
changes (Biersteker 1990). Shrinking Bbloated bureaucracies^ and pruning spending on
public sector compensation became the means through which countries would put their
fiscal houses in order and their economies on the right path (Nunberg and Nellis 1992;
Rama 1999; Rodrik 2000).
These ideas about the public sector as a problem in need of a solution affected policy
prescriptions in developing countries in part because the size of the civil service
increased rapidly in most developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s (Das 1998;
Goldsmith 1999; Rodrik 2000). Several factors drove these increases. First, civil
services were usually small at independence and needed to be larger to perform
important state functions (Goldsmith 1999). Second, state-led development increased
public sector employment in the civil service and state-owned enterprises (Rama 1999;
Rodrik 2000). Third, expanding public sector employment served important political
functions by employing educated people in urban areas and serving as a valuable
source of patronage (Gelb et al. 1991; Lindauer 1994; Das 1998; Goldsmith 1999; van
de Walle 2001; Shepherd 2003). Lastly, government employment is a social insurance
mechanism in small open economies vulnerable to shocks (Rodrik 2000) and a means
to compensate important constituencies negatively affected by globalization
(Nooruddin and Rudra 2009). Despite these pressures to expand public employment,
the size of the public sector in developing countries is relatively small in comparison to
OECD countries (Schiavo-Campo et al. 1997).4 But the perception of bloated bureau-
cracies and excessive spending on compensation had powerful ideological and institu-
tional support, and policy prescriptions increasingly called for reform.
Setting aside debates about the Bright^ size of the public sector, the fiscal crisis in
developing countries put tremendous pressure on government budgets (Lindauer 1994;
Goldsmith 1999). The fiscal burden of public sector wage bills caused particular
concern (Nunberg and Nellis 1992; Stevenson 1992). The wage bill is usually the
3 As Lee and Strang (2006) note, the perceived problem of oversized bureaucracies resulted in privatization
and retrenchments in OECD countries.
4 Public sector employment, however, constitutes a larger share of the non-agricultural workforce in devel-
oping countries and is also a large share of formal sector employment (Nunberg and Nellis 1992).
Rickard S.J., Caraway T.
single largest item of government expenditure and comprises almost 30% of govern-
ment budgets in lower income countries (Das 1998, 16; Forni and Novta 2014). If
governments had access to additional revenue, they might sustain spending on public
sector compensation. However, raising revenues is challenging for governments in
developing countries, so they typically have to cut expenditures to correct fiscal
imbalances (Independent Evaluation Office 2003; Bulír and Moon 2006; Nooruddin
and Simmons 2006). Despite the importance of the public sector wage bill in govern-
ment budgets, however, the IMF does not always require cuts to this budget area; this
variation in IMF loan conditions has important consequences for government spending.
2 Why variation in IMF loan conditions matters
Governments in economic crisis have compelling reasons to cut expenditures. What
budget items do they cut and why? We argue that governments try to avoid cutting the
public sector because doing so is politically costly. Governments who borrow from the
IMF will only make significant cuts to the public sector if required to do so as an
explicit condition of their loan. Governments want to protect the public sector wage bill
for two reasons. First, public sector employment helps assure political stability by
providing work to educated people in urban areas (Gelb et al. 1991; Lindauer 1994;
Das 1998; Goldsmith 1999; van de Walle 2001; Shepherd 2003). A large share of non-
agricultural employees in most developing countries work in the public sector, and
these jobs are an important social insurance mechanism, particularly in small open
economies vulnerable to shocks (Rodrik 2000). The geographic concentration of public
sector employees in urban areas and the greater likelihood that these citizens belong to
organizations that facilitate mobilization increases the potential for disruptive protests,
especially when few other attractive job opportunities exist in the formal sector.
Second, public sector jobs serve as a valuable source of patronage for key constit-
uencies and regime supporters (Shepherd 2003; Chandra 2007; Petersson 1993;
Khabele 1990). Politicians can use the allocation of public sector jobs to build their
power bases, reward supporters, and co-opt other groups (Chandra, 2004; Nooruddin
and Rudra, 2014; Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Keefer, 2007; Remmer, 2007). Even
autocracies will be averse to cutting the public sector, since ruling regimes typically
rely on a small coalition of loyal supporters—not a plurality of voters—for political
survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), and public sector jobs are a particularly
effective means to such purchase support (Lust-Okar 2006; Greene 2007; Magaloni
2008; Aidi 2009; Gandhi 2010; Blaydes 2011). The distribution of public sector jobs is
credible, targeted, and reversible, making it an ideal way for leaders to reward key
supporters (Robinson and Verdier 2013).
Since reductions to the public sector wage bill may undercut leaders’ support and
threaten their political survival, governments try to protect spending on public sector
wages and salaries, even when they face heavy debt burdens (Mahdavi 2004).
However, if economic circumstances compel them to borrow from the IMF, govern-
ments may be required to prune spending. Reducing the budget deficit is a central
component of most IMF programs, so fiscal conditions of one sort or another are
omnipresent in IMF loans (Bulír and Moon 2006). However, fiscal conditions take varied
forms, and their variations have important consequences for a government’s ability to protect
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the public sector wage bill. The relevant distinction for the wage bill is between general and
targeted fiscal conditions.
General fiscal conditions require governments to spend less than a specified aggre-
gate spending limit. General conditions are by far the most common type of fiscal
condition attached to loans. Between 1983 and 1990, 91% of IMF loans included
general fiscal conditions and from the early 1990s, 100% of IMF loans included them
(Gould 2006, 90). Governments that receive general fiscal conditions must meet the
specified spending limit but have flexibility as to which items they must cut in order to
meet the aggregate target. Governments with such autonomy will focus on easy
targets—cutting spending on programs associated with the least organized and least
politically influential interests (Nooruddin and Simmons 2006). Governments will
protect programs that affect well-organized, politically powerful groups, such as public
sector workers.
Targeted fiscal conditions, in contrast, require cuts to specific budget items, such as
the public sector wage bill. Benin’s 2001 IMF program, for example, included a
targeted condition that required the public sector wage bill be reduced to less than
4.6% of GDP.5 Such targeted public sector conditions are relatively infrequent. Only
25% of IMF loans made during the period from 1980 to 2014 specify limits on or cuts
to public sector employment or wages as a condition of the loan.6 Governments that
receive conditions targeting the public sector wage bill cannot shift cuts to other budget
items without risking delays or suspensions of subsequent disbursements of funds.
Although the IMF sometimes waives conditions and continues disbursements despite
noncompliance, the Fund at times exercises its power to suspend loans when countries
fail to comply with their loan conditions (Ivanova et al. 2003). Consequently, noncom-
pliance entails some risk. Even if the loan is not suspended, governments may fear the
reputation costs of non-compliance with IMF conditions. Foreign investors may view
negatively a governments’ unwillingness to reform. In order to minimize the reputation
costs of non-compliance and the risk of loan suspension, we anticipate that borrowers
who receive targeted conditions will attempt to make some progress on them even if
they do not completely meet the target. By making headway, the government shows
good faith, which reduces the chances of loan suspension. We therefore hypothesize
that targeted public sector conditions will engender deeper cuts to the wage bill than
general fiscal conditions, all else equal.
Egypt and Tanzania provide good illustrations of the logic of our argument. In
Tanzania, the IMF program stipulated targeted public sector conditions. Every year of
Tanzania’s 3-year ESAF arrangement (1996–99) included conditions that required the
government to reduce the number of public sector employees and/or set limits on
budget expenditures on public sector wages and salaries. Given the targeted nature of
these conditions, the government could not avoid making cuts to the public sector
without jeopardizing their IMF program. The government met all of the public
sector conditions, albeit in one case tardily, and by the end of the program, civil
service employment had fallen by 8% (Independent Evaluation Office 2003). In
contrast, Egypt received no targeted public sector conditions in their 1991 loan.
Instead, the IMF required the Egyptian government to meet an aggregate fiscal deficit
5 http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2001/ben/01/index.htm
6 More precisely, 25% of loan-country-years.
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target.7 The government met its deficit target even though it increased spending on the
public sector wage bill by 12%. They achieved this outcome by increasing domestic
energy prices and fees, raising customs duties, and terminating some tax holidays.8
IMF loans engender varied responses by borrowing governments, as these two cases
illustrate. Following the receipt of an IMF loan, the Tanzanian government cut the wage
bill while the Egyptian government increased spending on the wage bill. The varied
governmental responses stem from the conditions attached to each country’s IMF loan.
Consistent with our argument, the government that received targeted public sector loan
conditions (Tanzania) cut the wage bill while the government with general fiscal
conditions (Egypt) did not. As these examples show, identifying the precise conditions
included in countries’ loan programs can improve understanding of the impact of IMF
loans on borrowing countries.
3 Public sector conditions dataset
To identify the conditions attached to countries’ IMF loans, we scrutinize the Letters of
Intent (LOI), which are normally drafted by IMF staff after negotiating with borrowing
governments. The Letters of Intent, and the frequently attached Memorandum of
Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP), stipulate the loan's conditions. Upon agree-
ment of the conditions, national executives, typically the Minister for Finance and/or
the Governor of the Central Bank, sign the LOI/MEFP.
We examine the LOI/MEFP for all IMF loans made during the period from 1980 to
2014. We identify and code conditions that stipulate limits on or cuts to public sector
wages and/or employment. We refer to these conditions as Bpublic sector conditions.^
Public sector conditions include ceilings on the amount of money spent on the
compensation of public sector employees (Clements et al. 2010, 6). For example,
Burkina Faso’s 2005 loan stipulated that the wage bill must not exceed 69.7 billion
West African CFA francs.9 To meet a ceiling on wage bill spending, governments may
cut or temporarily freeze public sector wages (Clements et al. 2010, 6). The Irish
government, for example, cut public sector wages by 5 to 8% to fulfill the
terms of their 2010 loan program.10 Public sector conditions also include mandatory
hiring freezes, which when combined with natural attrition, can reduce the wage bill
(Clements et al. 2010, 7). Public sector conditions may also require mandatory lay-offs.
Uganda’s 1993 loan, for example, required that 65,000 employees be removed from the
civil service. A condition of Bulgaria’s 2006 loan was, Ban employment cut of at least
5,500 positions in the education sector.^ 11 Dismissals and hiring freezes reduce the
number of people employed in the public sector and consequently help to shrink the
wage bill.
Our original data differ from existing data on IMF conditionality in several ways, as
illustrated by Table 1. First, our dataset identifies conditions that require limits on or
7 The IMF did not include targeted conditions despite its view that Egypt needed public sector reform. The
IMF asked, but did not require, the government to reduce the real wage bill by 15% in 1992/93.
8 See IMF documents EBS/93/7/S1 and EBS/93/7.
9 http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2005/bfa/081605.pdf
10 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/12/articles/IE0912029I.htm
11 http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2006/bgr/071706.pdf
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cuts to public sector wages and/or employment. Some datasets do not disaggregate
conditions—that is, they focus on the total number of conditions included in a country’s
loan program (e.g. Copelovitch 2010). Among those that do disaggregate conditions,
most do not identify public sector conditions. Gould (2003), for example, examines
Bbank-friendly^ conditions. Caraway et al. (2012), Rickard and Caraway (2014) and
Kentikelenis et al. (2016) report data on Blabor market^ conditions but this category
pools together both public and private sector labor market reform conditions. Dreher
and Jensen (2007) have a category labelled Bpublic sector^ conditions. However, this
category may include public sector conditions that are not intended to affect the wage
bill, such as those requiring the drafting of civil service reform legislation. The IMF’s
Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) dataset lists loan conditions but it is
difficult to determine which ones target public sector wages or employment using
MONA’s categories. 12 Additionally, Binformation in the MONA database…may be
incomplete or ambiguous in certain instances. Not all structural benchmarks are well
recorded^ (Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya 2004, 81).
Second, our dataset includes all loan programs. Every IMF program agreed during
the period from 1980 to 2014 for which loan documents are available is included in our
sample.13 In contrast, other datasets examine only a subset of loans. Gould (2003)
investigates just 20 countries’ loans. More ambitiously, Dreher and Jensen (2007)
examine 38 countries.
Third, our data cover a substantial number of years (34) and include the most recent
decade. Although Gould (2003) examines a longer period (43 years), her sample ends
in 1995. Copelovitch (2010) covers 19 years ending in 2003. Dreher and Jensen’s
(2007) data cover 6 years ending in 2003. MONA covers the period from 1993
to 2014. However, the archived data (1993–2002) are formatted differently than
the current data (2002–2014) and coverage for 1993–2002 period is less
comprehensive than ours because many loans are not included in their archived
data for unknown reasons. Only Kentikelenis et al. (2016) have the same scope
as our data in terms of years and countries, but they do not code public sector
conditions.
12 MONA is not an off-the-shelf data set that can be easily utilized for data analysis. The archived data (1993–
2002) are formatted differently than the current data (2002–2014). The current MONA data are more
comprehensive, and each entry in the data set is a unique condition-economic category pair for each phase
of the loan. Given this structure, further manipulation is required in order to ascertain the total conditionality in
a given year for a given type of condition. The same condition often appears under multiple economic
categories and conditions continue to be listed in the coding for review documents even after the conditions
have been met. Care must be taken not to count each entry as a new or continuing condition. The data set is
essentially a summary of conditions attached to the initial loan and to subsequent reviews, and the status of
each condition (e.g., met, delayed) at the time of each review.
13 For the period 1980–2000, we directly coded conditions from loan documents obtained in the IMF archive.
For 2001–2014, we relied on several publicly available online sources to determine whether loans contained
the relevant public sector conditions. We first inventoried all loans, including their beginning and end dates, by
compiling a list of arrangements from each country’s BFinancial Position in the Fund^ page on the IMF
website. We then scrutinized MONA for the conditions listed under the relevant list of BEconomic
Descriptors^ (e.g., Civil Service and Public Employment, Wages, Expenditures) for conditions that met our
coding criteria. We then reviewed the relevant loan documents on the IMF’s website in order to review them
more carefully and to ascertain the date of the review. Finally, we also sampled at least one set of documents
from each loan to ascertain whether indicative targets for public sector wages, which are not coded in MONA,
were in place during the loan period.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our dataset includes changes in loan condi-
tions over time. Many IMF loans span multiple years and the conditions often change
over the life of a loan. The Fund typically updates conditions when it reviews a
country’s performance and when it issues new arrangement letters. For example,
benchmarks are often Bupgraded^ to performance criteria in subsequent years when a
government fails to make significant progress on a reform. Our dataset captures this
evolution by coding the conditions in each year of a country’s loan program.14 As a
result, we can identify the precise years in which public sector conditions are added to
countries’ loan programs.
We code 207 instances of within-country, over-time change in public sector loan
conditions.15 Honduras, for example, borrowed continuously from 1990 to 1997. For
the first four years, the IMF did not require any public sector reforms in exchange for
financing. But in 1995 a public sector condition was added to Honduras’ loan program
and the government was subsequently obliged to reduce expenditures on public sector
employment. Similarly, Bulgaria borrowed from the IMF for eight years without any
public sector conditions, but in 1999 the IMF added a public sector condition to
Bulgaria’s program.
Many previous studies miss these changes in conditionality because they only code
the conditions included in the initial loan documents—even for loans that persist over
multiple years (e.g., Gould 2003 and Copelovitch 2010).16 In contrast, we code the
changes in conditions over the duration of a loan program. These data allow us to
investigate what happens when a public sector condition is added to a borrower’s loan
program. In this way, our control group or counterfactual for each country is the
country itself under a different treatment status (e.g., under an IMF program without
a public sector condition). Many confounding variables are consequently excluded as
potential alternative explanations. This empirical strategy is possible because of our
novel data on changes in IMF loan conditions over time.
4 Concerns about endogeneity
In order to assess the extent to which IMF loan conditions matter, we investigate
whether loans that require cuts to the public sector engender deeper cuts to the wage bill
than loans without such requirements. Note that we only compare borrowing countries
to other borrowing countries—that is, our sample includes only countries with IMF
loans. We exploit the variation in borrowers’ loan conditions. However, to convincingly
draw conclusions about the effects of loan conditions, we must consider the possibility
that governments who receive targeted conditions are systematically different from
14 In cases where a country is still in a loan program but during which there is not a review or a new
arrangement, we carry forward the conditions from the previous year.
15 Performance criteria, benchmarks and indicative targets are all included in our Bpublic sector condition^
variable. This coding criterion is identical to that employed by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office
(2003). Arguably, this coding strategy biases against finding evidence in support of our hypothesis because it
includes Bsoft conditions^ —i.e., benchmarks and indicative targets—which countries can ignore without their
loan being automatically suspended.
16 Although MONA contains the data needed to track changes in conditions over time, the current MONA
data do not include the dates of reviews, so one must consult the review documents to find this information.
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those who do not.17 Governments may, for example, ask for targeted loan conditions in
order to make their desired reforms more politically feasible (Remmer 1986, Vreeland
2003). If reform-minded governments ask for targeted conditions in order to Bscapegoat^
the IMF, any subsequent spending cuts cannot be credited to conditionality alone.
Because we are interested in the extent to which IMF conditions engender domestic
reform, we must wrestle with the difficult question of whether governments cut the
public sector because they receive targeted conditions, or whether they received
targeted conditions because they want to cut the public sector. In other words, we need
to assess a government’s Bpolitical will^ for reform (Bird 1996; Vreeland 2003).
However, governments’ willingness to reform is not directly observable (Wei and
Zhang 2010, 77). We therefore build on existing research to identify which govern-
ments are most likely to support cuts to the public sector.
Governments from the right of the ideological spectrum tend to be more willing to
cut the public sector than left-leaning governments (Garrett and Lange 1991; Pop-
Eleches 2009). According to the scapegoating logic, right-governments will therefore
be more likely to seek public sector conditions from the IMF because such conditions
would provide them with the Bpolitical cover^ needed to make the desired cuts. If the
scapegoating logic is at work, right-governments should receive more public sector
conditions than left governments, all else equal. However, we find no evidence of this
pattern in our data. In fact, left-governments receive most of the loans with public
sector conditions (56%). This pattern is precisely the opposite of what the scapegoating
argument would suggest.
Furthermore, government ideology is not a robust predictor of public sector loan
conditions. We estimate a probit model where the dependent variable equals 1 for IMF
loans with at least one public sector condition and 0 for loans without any public sector
conditions.18 Government ideology is not statistically significant in any specification of
the model. Right governments are no more likely to receive a public sector condition
than left governments, all else equal. In short, governments’ Bwillingness to reform^—
as estimated by ideology—is not correlated with the receipt of public sector conditions.
Opposition to public sector cuts may be fiercest in countries with larger public
sectors. In such cases, reform-minded governments may be especially eager to take
17 In other words, our focus is on the second stage of a two-stage process where the first stage determines the
loan conditions and the second stage estimates the effect of these conditions. Ideally, we would estimate a two-
stage model. However, despite our best efforts, we could not find a suitable instrument for public sector
conditions that met the necessary exclusion restrictions. Therefore, following previous studies (Wei and Zhang
2010; Clements et al. 2013; Kentikelenis et al. 2015; Independent Evaluation Office 2003), we control for
potential bias due to non-random country selection into loans with public sector conditions by including the
inverse-Mills ratio (IMR) in our model (Heckman 1979). These models are reported in the Appendix. The
IMR values are generated using a probit model of public sector conditions, which is also reported in the
Appendix. A significant negative coefficient on the inverse-Mills ratio would indicate unobserved variables
that make a public sector condition more likely are associated with lower spending on the wage bill. However,
the IMR is never statistically significant in any of the estimated models. The null results suggest that any
unobserved variables that make a public sector condition more likely do not significantly affect government
spending on the wage bill. As a further robustness check, we apply the method proposed by Altonji et al.
(2005) and Chaudoin et al. (2016) to test how strong selection on unobservables would have to be in order to
explain away our results. We find that selection on unobservables would have to be two to three times as
strong as selection on observables to account for the entire estimated effect of public sector conditions on the
wage bill.
18 These results are reported in the Appendix.
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advantage of the Bpolitical cover^ provided by the IMF. However, the size of a
country’s wage bill is not a robust predictor of public sector loan conditions. 19
Countries with larger wage bills are no more likely to receive a targeted condition than
countries with smaller wage bills.20 In other words, governments facing large public
sectors are no more likely to receive a public sector loan condition than governments
facing smaller public sectors.
Taken together, this evidence suggests that any selection bias in the allocation of
public sector conditions is not working in the way one might suspect. Governments
ideologically predisposed to cutting the public sector are no more likely to receive
public sector conditions than governments opposed to public sector cuts. In fact, left-
leaning governments face relatively more public sector conditions than right-leaning
governments. Similarly, governments facing larger public sectors are no more (or less)
likely to receive public sector conditions than governments facing smaller public
sectors. Any cuts made subsequent to the receipt of a public sector loan condition
can therefore be credited, at least in part, to the condition itself.
5 Government spending on the public sector
We measure the amount of government spending on the public sector wage bill using
data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). The WDI data
come primarily from the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics.
These data permit comparisons across countries and over time (International Monetary
Fund 2014). Governments’ conventional accounts are generally not suitable for these
purposes because they reflect the organizational structures of government.
Organizational changes may consequently distort time-series analyses (International
Monetary Fund 2001). However, the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics
(International Monetary Fund 2014) avoid the problems of organizational differences
between countries and allow for meaningful comparisons over time and between
countries.
Using these cross-nationally comparable data, we construct a variable,
Compensation, which equals the total amount of central government spending on
employee compensation as a percentage of GDP.21 Spending on employee compensa-
tion includes all payments in cash, as well as in kind (such as food and housing), to
employees in return for services rendered, and government contributions to social
19 These results are reported in the Appendix.
20 This finding suggests that IMF loan conditions do not necessarily reflect underlying economic fundamen-
tals. This observation is consistent with others studies that suggest politics—rather than economics alone—
shape IMF loan conditions (Caraway et al. 2012; Chapman et al. 2015; Dreher et al. 2015; Nelson 2014;
Rickard and Caraway 2014). However, we found no robust political variables in our probit models of public
sector conditions. These results raise questions about the universality of scapegoating. Others have raised
similar doubts. Nelson (2014), for example, finds that fewer conditions are included in countries’ loan
programs as the proportion of Bneoliberal^ leaders in a borrowing government increases. In a similar vein,
Caraway et al. (2012) find little evidence that right governments receive tougher labor market reform
conditions—of which public sector conditions are a subset.
21 The central government consists of the institutional units of the central government. The political authority
of the central government extends over the entire territory of the country.
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insurance schemes such as social security and pensions that provide benefits to
employees.22 The median sample value of Compensation equals 6%.23
6 Sample and empirical strategy
Our sample includes only countries under an IMF program. By examining only
countries borrowing from the IMF, we sidestep the myriad difficulties that arise
when comparing borrowers to non-borrowers (Bulír and Moon 2006; Dreher
and Jensen 2007). Countries that borrow from the IMF differ systematically
from non-borrowers and comparing the two groups can lead to incorrect
inferences. We avoid this pitfall by restricting our sample to only those
country-years with an IMF loan program.
Ultimately, we want to know the total impact of public sector conditions on the wage
bill. The total impact may include both immediate changes and longer-term effects.
More precisely, there are three distinct possibilities: 1) the addition of a public sector
condition to a country’s loan program may have only contemporaneous effects, where
the condition affects Compensation in the short-term, but the effect does not persist into
the future; 2) a public sector condition may have a contemporaneous effect as well as a
long-run effect that persists across future time periods and decays at some rate; or 3) a
public sector condition may have no contemporaneous effect, but instead has a long-run
effect, where the effect of a public sector condition on Compensation occurs only
across future time periods.
An error correction models (ECM) allows us to estimate and test for all three of
these possibilities.24 Using an ECM, we can model both long- and short-term forces
simultaneously in a single statistical model. This makes it possible to examine directly
the longitudinal question of whether changes in IMF loan conditions inspire changes in
government spending. To date, this question has been largely neglected because of the
lack of data on changes in loan conditions over time.25
The error correction model takes the following form:
Δ (compensationit) =β0 +β1∙ (compensationit-1) + γΔXit + λXit-1 + μi + λt + εit,
where X equals Public Sector Condition, which is coded 1 for loan-years that
include a public sector condition and 0 otherwise. ΔXit is restricted to non-negative
values to designate the addition of a public sector condition to a country’s loan
program.26 The dependent variable is the annual change in Compensation in country,
i, for year, t. Calculating the year-to-year difference in Compensation eliminates
concerns about the distribution of the level variable because the differenced variable
22 It does not include the compensation of employees engaged in own-account capital formation. The central
government wage bill also excludes the military.
23 This value is in line with other studies, such as Baddock et al. (2015).
24 Researchers have shown that error correction models have applications beyond estimating co-integrating
relationships (De Boef and Keele 2008).
25 See Chow and Kono (2017), Doyle (2015), Nooruddin and Simmons (2006), Nooruddin and Vreeland
(2010), Remmer (2004), Rickard (2012), and Wellhausen (2015).
26 When public sector conditions are included in the first year of a country’s loan program, both L.Public
Sector Condition and D.Public Sector Condition are coded as missing. This ensures the integrity of our
empirical strategy. When a country’s loan begins with a public sector condition, there is no appropriate
comparison (i.e., no counterfactual).
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has a normal distribution. Differencing the series also helps to minimize the potential
for a spurious correlation between two series exhibiting a time trend (De Boef and
Keele 2008; Huber and Stephens 2001). μi and λt capture country and year fixed
effects, respectively.
In the error correction model, γ and λ are vectors of coefficients for the first-
differences and lagged independent variables, respectively. Coefficients for the change
variables (γ) measure the short-term effects of a once-off change in a variable. The
estimated coefficients for the level variables (i.e., lagged variables) (λ) capture the
effect of a once-off change in a variable dispersed across future time periods. The total
effect of a once-off change can be found by dividing a variable’s lagged coefficient by
the coefficient on β1.
While a fully specified ECM imposes fewer restrictive assumptions than
other time-series models (De Boef and Keele 2008), the error correction
model in combination with robust standard errors and year and country-
fixed effects, as estimated here, produces very conservative results.27 While
this estimation strategy carries some risk of discarding true hypotheses pre-
maturely, it increases our confidence in the coefficients that do emerge as
statistically significant.
Table 2 reports the results from the error correction model. Each column introduces a
theoretically-relevant control variable. Our models are relatively parsimonious
for both practical and theoretical reasons (Achen 2005). We have a relatively
small sample size and introducing further control variables significantly reduces
the number of observations. We are especially concerned about losing within-
country changes in loan conditions. We control for variables that may affect
both public sector conditions and Compensation, including:
Democracy. A country’s regime type may influence both the size of the public sector
and the government’s willingness to cut certain budget items (Nooruddin and
Simmons 2006). We therefore control for regime type using the 21-point Polity
scale. However, Democracy is not a robust predictor of Compensation in any of
the estimated models.
Economic growth. A country with weak economic growth may have little choice but
to accept the terms dictated by the IMF (Nooruddin and Vreeland 2010). At
the same time, governments may cut the public sector wage bill of their own
accord when facing negative economic growth. A spurious negative correla-
tion could therefore emerge between public sector conditions and reductions
in public sector spending. To avoid this possibility, we control for economic
growth using the year-to-year percent change in GDP calculated using data
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. We find a positive
coefficient between Growth and Compensation—suggesting that countries
spend more on the public sector wage bill when the economy is growing
faster.
GDP per capita. As countries become wealthier, governments may need to increase
their supply of goods and services that would otherwise be undersupplied by
the market. As a result, wealthier countries may have relatively larger public
27 As a robustness test, we estimate the models with only country fixed effects. These results are reported in
the Appendix.
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sectors. Wealthier countries may also receive fewer IMF loan conditions, as
suggested in some previous studies (Baumol 1993). To avoid a potentially
spurious correlation, we control for GDP per capita. The coefficient on our
key variable of interest—Public Sector Condition—does not change significant-
ly after the addition of GDP per capita to the model.
Although these do not constitute the universe of all possible control variables, we
believe they are the most theoretically relevant and the ones most likely to
generate a spurious correlation between Public Sector Condition and
Compensation. As a robustness check, we apply the method proposed by
Altonji et al. (2005) and Chaudoin et al. (2016) to see how strong selection
on unobservables would have to be in order to explain away our key result. We
find that selection on unobservables would have to be two to three times as
Table 2 Estimated effect of public sector loan conditions on the wage bill
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV =Δ.Compensation
L.Compensation 0.020 0.021 0.051 0.053
(0.057) (0.056) (0.028) (0.027)
L.Public Sector Condition −0.222 −0.208 −0.093 −0.066
(0.155) (0.164) (0.093) (0.095)
Δ.Public Sector Condition −0.577** −0.606** −0.637*** −0.604***
(0.227) (0.252) (0.217) (0.214)
L.Democracy 0.021 0.007 0.004
(0.039) (0.031) (0.032)
Δ.Democracy 0.028 0.014 0.016
(0.032) (0.022) (0.021)
L.Growth 3.698** 6.171***
(1.569) (1.835)
Δ.Growth 1.871 3.851**
(1.595) (1.602)
L.GDP per capita −0.041
(0.049)
Δ.GDP per capita −0.514***
(0.189)
Constant −0.494 −0.664 −0.851 −0.448
(0.604) (0.623) (0.464) (0.613)
Observations 612 576 508 508
R-squared 0.159 0.169 0.148 0.157
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 93 83 81 81
Error correction model with robust standard errors in parentheses and year and country fixed-effects; ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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strong as selection on observables to account for the reported effects of public
sector conditions .28
7 Results
Public sector conditions are robustly correlated with short-term cuts to the wage bill, as
reported in Table 2. The coefficients onΔ.Public Sector Conditions report the estimat-
ed effects of adding a public sector condition to a country’s loan program. In all models,
the coefficients on Δ.Public Sector Conditions are negatively signed and statistically
significant, which indicate that the addition of a public sector condition to a country’s
loan program correlates with a short-term reduction in the wage bill. In the short-run at
least, IMF conditions Bwork^; they engender spending cuts precisely where the Fund
wants to see them—in this case, the public sector wage bill.
To investigate the durability of IMF-induced spending cuts, we calculate the long
run multiplier (LRM) using the results from the error correction model. The long run
multiplier (LRM) reports the total effect of public sector conditions on compensation:
that is, the short-run effect plus any longer-run effects. These values are reported in
Table 3. Using Bewley’s (1979) method, we calculate the standard errors for the LRM.
The LRM and their associated standard errors show that public sector conditions are
not significantly correlated with the wage bill in the long-run.29 None of the LRMs are
statistically significant.30 Public sector conditions have no significant, lasting effect on
the public sector wage bill. Although borrowers initially cut public sector spending in
response to targeted IMF conditions, these cuts are not sustained over time.
This finding is consistent with the IMF’s own assessment of public sector reform in
borrowing countries. The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF concluded
that reductions in public employment and public-sector wages induced by IMF pro-
grams are short-lived because they are easily reversed (Independent Evaluation Office
2003, 10). The IEO reports that short-term declines in public sector wages are often
followed by reversals because of Bdomestic pressures^ (Independent Evaluation Office
2003). In Uganda, for example, the IMF identified public sector reform as a pressing
issue, and in 1993, the IMF required the Ugandan government to eliminate 65,000
employees from the civil service as a condition of its loan.31 Although Uganda made
good progress towards reaching this benchmark condition, it fell short by 25,000
employees. In 1994, the IMF ratcheted up the condition to a performance criterion—
the most stringent form of conditionality—and increased the required cumulative
reduction to 150,000 personnel.32 Uganda met this condition, and the following year,
the IMF dropped the public sector conditions from the country’s loan program. 33
Although the IMF asked for a freeze on net employment and continued vigilance on
28 These results are available from the authors upon request.
29 For another example of statistically significant short-term effects that disappear over time see Chow and
Kono (2017).
30 Although the LRM are not statistically significant, they are all positive—suggesting that government
spending on the wage bill may trend up over time after the initial cut.
31 IMF document EBS/93/172
32 IMF document EBS/94/157
33 IMF documents EBS/95/62 and EBS/95/173
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wage increases, the Fund attached no binding conditions to these requests.
Unconstrained by explicit public-sector conditions, the government, under in-
tense domestic pressure, increased spending on the wage bill by 37% from
1995 to 1996.34 The government appeared unable (or unwilling) to maintain the
IMF-mandated cuts in the face of strong political pressures at home. 35 The
Ugandan example illustrates that governments may reverse public sector re-
forms once targeted IMF loan conditions are removed from the country’s loan.
Although the IMF’s own observations of backsliding are largely anecdotal, our
results provide some of the first quantitative evidence of Bbacksliding.^
8 Substantive effects
Despite the likelihood of backsliding, the short-run effects of public sector conditions
are important. Even short-term cuts can reduce essential public services, such as health
care and education, because the wage bill is a key input in the provision of health and
education (Forni and Novta 2014). Public sector employment cuts in Estonia, for
example, were blamed for lengthier medical waiting lists (International Labour Office
2012). Similarly, in Ireland, temporary cuts to public sector employment made in
response to the country’s 2010 loan program, reduced access to health services
(Burke 2009). In sum, short-term cuts to the wage bill can have important
consequences.
In Bolivia, for example, spending on the wage bill fell sharply after the addition of a
public sector condition to the country’s loan program. The Bolivian government
borrowed from the IMF continuously from 1986 to 2006. In 1996, a public sector
condition was added to its loan program and spending on public sector employees
subsequently fell by 3.2% year-on-year. The public sector condition remained in place
until 1999. After it was removed from Bolivia’s loan program, spending on the wage
bill increased by 0.43% the following year. By 2002, the wage bill had risen to nearly
the same level as its pre-1996 value, again illustrating backsliding by governments in
response to domestic politics once IMF conditions expire.
34 IMF document EBS/96/61 and EBS 96/170
35 Backsliding occurs in other politically sensitive policy areas, such as trade (Wei and Zhang 2010, 80; Bown
and Tovar 2011).
Table 3 Short and long run effects of the addition of a public sector loan condition
1 2 3 4
Short Term Effect −0.577** −0.606** −0.637*** −0.604***
(0.227) (0.252) (0.217) (0.214)
Long Run Effect 12.51 11.91 1.53 1.16
(46.56) (42.85) (3.08) (2.64)
Long run effects and the corresponding standard errors are calculated using Bewley’s (1979) method to
uncover the long run multipliers using the results from Table 2
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9 Conclusion and implications
Nearly 70 years after the first IMF loan, the effects of IMF lending remain contested. In
this paper, we offer a straightforward explanation for the ongoing disagreement over
the effects of IMF loans. We argue that because loan conditions vary between IMF
programs, IMF loans do not have a single, invariant effect on all borrowers. Differences
in the conditions attached to IMF loans have consequences for the effects of IMF
lending. To accurately assess the effects of IMF lending, scholars must disaggregate
loan conditions and link specific conditions to specific outcomes, as we do in this study.
We show that IMF loan conditions matter. IMF loan programs affect policy out-
comes through conditionality. We demonstrate this with respect to the public sector.
The addition of at least one public sector condition to a country’s loan program is
robustly correlated with a reduction in the public sector wage bill. This finding
contributes novel evidence to the ongoing debate over which mechanisms link IMF
programs to policy change (Dreher 2009). Our contribution is to provide a convincing
test of whether conditionality is one of the mechanisms through which IMF lending has
its effects. If governments choose to ignore their loan conditions, we would find no
significant difference in the wage bill between countries with and without public sector
conditions. Such a null result would cast doubt on the plausibility of conditionality as a
key mechanism. However, we find that governments facing public sector loan condi-
tions make deeper cuts to the wage bill than governments under IMF programs without
public sector conditions, which suggests that conditions matter.
While targeted conditions have a significant reductive effect on the wage bill in the
short run, these effects are not sustained over time. We speculate that backsliding due to
domestic pressures explains why public sector conditions have no robust, long-term
effect on the wage bill. Since cuts to the public sector fall on politically powerful
groups, borrowers will only cut the public sector when they have to—that is, when they
receive targeted loan conditions (rather than generic loan conditions). Once the knife of
conditionality is no longer at a government’s throat, governments will increase public
sector spending to appease powerful domestic constituents. Such politically-motivated
backsliding may explain why IMF conditions fail to engender long-term public sector
reform.
Our findings suggest that previous studies may have underestimated countries’
compliance with IMF conditions. Some studies report that IMF loans have no mean-
ingful effect on government policy because of non-compliance with loan conditions
(e.g., Wei and Zhang 2010; Bown and Tovar 2011). And conventional wisdom holds
that governments rarely implement IMF-mandated public sector reforms. Yet we find
evidence that—at least in the short-term—governments with explicit public sector
conditions in their IMF programs cut spending on the wage bill.36 We believe that
linking specific conditions to specific outcomes is an innovation that accounts for our
novel finding. Since most IMF loans do not mandate cuts to the public sector, failure to
find a robust correlation between all IMF programs and public sector reforms cannot be
interpreted as Bnon-compliance^ or ineffectiveness. Instead, the appropriate sub-sample
36 Nooruddin and Simmons (2006) suggest that borrowing countries will cut social spending to protect the
public sector wage bill. But as we have shown, borrowing countries that receive targeted public sector
conditions have less flexibility to choose where to make budget cuts.
Rickard S.J., Caraway T.
of IMF programs to examine are those with explicit public sector conditions. By
disaggregating loans and differentiating those that contain targeted conditions
from those that do not, we come to different conclusions than other authors.
This leads us to believe that by ignoring the variation in IMF loan conditions,
previous studies may underestimate compliance and possibly misdiagnose the
effects of IMF lending.
Disaggregating loans conditions may help to resolve further puzzles about
IMF lending, such as the varied political responses to IMF programs. Dreher
and Gassebner (2012), for example, find no consistently robust effect of IMF
loans on government crises.37 One reason for the varied political responses to
IMF programs may be differences in loan conditions, which engender different
types of reforms with varied distributional consequences. An improved under-
standing of the political and economic consequences of international sovereign
lending may come from a disaggregated approach to conditionality, as adopted
in our study.
The evidence we find of backsliding calls into question arguments about Bpolitical
cover.^ If governments use the IMF as political cover to implement desired reforms, it
is unlikely that they would reverse these reforms once the condition expires. We
speculate that political cover may not be the predominant negotiating posture of many
governments, particularly with respect to labor and public sector employment issues.38
Further research is needed to clarify the precise conditions under which the political
cover argument is most appropriate.
Our results have thought-provoking policy implications. Over the past de-
cades, the IMF aimed to provide governments with greater Bownership^ of their
loan programs. To this end, the IMF often stipulated only general fiscal targets
and let governments decide for themselves where in the budget to make the
necessary cuts. As we demonstrate, politically difficult spending cuts are un-
likely to happen when governments have ownership over their loan programs.
Reforms in contentious areas, such as the public sector, will only occur when
explicitly required by the IMF. Paradoxically, then, the IMF’s efforts to give
governments greater autonomy in deciding where to make budget cuts may
delay the implementation of economic reforms. Governments with ownership
over their programs will cut spending where it is least politically painful rather
than where it is most needed.
This study has implications beyond IMF programs. Public sector conditions
in IMF programs provide an example of reforms introduced through external
interventions via other multilateral and regional institutions (e.g., the World
Bank, the European Central Bank, etc.) and bilateral financial assistance pro-
grams. The lessons reported in the current study are, in principle, applicable to
conditionality in a variety of international assistance packages. In this broader
context, our results suggest that international lenders can use loan conditions to
engender cuts to specific budget items but once this leverage is gone, the
reforms tend not to stick.
37 In contrast, however, Smith and Vreeland (2006) find evidence that IMF loans affect leaders’ survival in
office.
38 See also Nelson (2014) for further suggestive evidence on this point.
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